Much ink has been spilled in recent times on the standards for, and outcomes of, patent eligibility questions under § 101.  Consider, for example, USPTO Director Andrei Iancu’s remarks in September about providing additional guidance to Patent Office examiners, and various analyses of invalidation rates in the federal courts. (We touched on invalidation rates ourselves in our Bilski Blog update in August, at which time the Federal Circuit’s cumulative invalidation rate since July 2014 was hovering north of 88 percent.)

One topic has received little attention, however: The rulings of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board on pre-grant § 101 examiner rejections appealed by applicants.  In my opinion, this constitutes the proverbial elephant in the room for patent prosecutors.


Continue Reading

By: Stuart P. Meyer

There has been significant commentary, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice, that the various judicially created exceptions to patentability under 35 USC § 101 are not only sound, but are also constitutionally mandated.  For instance, a major thesis of the ACLU’s amicus brief in Alice was that the First Amendment naturally limits § 101, as “patents giving control over intellectual concepts and abstract knowledge or ideas—and thus limiting free thought—would violate the First Amendment.”

The Court may have already given some guidance in this area, and lower courts appear to be listening.  In a September 4 decision, one judge in the Central District of California had no difficulty dismissing, via FRCP 12(b)(6), an infringement complaint because the court found that the three patents-in-suit did not satisfy § 101, based on the judicially created exceptions as taught by AliceEclipse IP LLC v. McKinley Equipment Corp., Case No. SACV 14-742-GW (C.D. Cal. September 4, 2014).  Judge George Wu observed that Justice Kennedy in Bilski, delivering the opinion of the Court explained the limitations on  § 101.  The pertinent portion of Bilski reads:  “While these exceptions are not required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be ‘new and useful.’  And, in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”


Continue Reading